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Auctions are a ubiquitous process, with auctioneers playing a critical role in 
serving as a bridge between buyers and sellers, and as such assisting in the 
process of price discovery. Given this critical role, the regulation of auctions 
and auctioneers is of particular concern. The emergence of online selling has 
raised a number of pertinent questions about how the industry should be re-
gulated. In particular so-called penny auctions (in economic parlance “unit 
bid auction”) have raised a number of pertinent questions about consumer 
protections. Whether these online selling models constitute auctions, and 
whether they mirror “bricks and mortar” rivals remain pertinent questions. 
Moreover, the adequacy of the regulatory apparatus that moderates the activi-
ties of auctioneers operating within conventional “analogue markets” is un-
certain when such apparatus is applied to “digital markets” involving online 
selling through auction like processes. The current study considers need for 
regulation of unit bit auction in light of the underlying economics of such 
auction models. The model suggests that enhanced disclosure and greater 
regulation may ultimately be necessary. 
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1. Introduction 
We are observing a revolution of sorts, with many computer mediated technolo-
gies changing the way we do business. These disruptive technologies are forcing 
organizations to rethink the way that they engage and connect with other organ-
izations and individuals, and pertinently changed the shape of business and 
commerce. This is particularly true in relation of the purchase of goods and 
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services online. A number of disruptive business models have emerged, such as 
coupon based product and service acquisition, online (English and Dutch mod-
el) auction based selling, and in recent times variants on conventional auction 
models such as the penny auction model. Many of these models bear obvious 
and logical similarity with their “physical world” equivalents, but some are mar-
kedly different from their bricks and mortar equivalents.  
Coupon based business websites benefit from being able to secure preferential 
pricing and discounts for their network of subscribers by virtue of their ability to 
generate promotional opportunities for their vendor partners. As such, coupon 
based business websites benefit from network effects associated with large net-
works, in this case a network of buyers looking for discounted goods and servic-
es. Such business models also evidence economies of scale, given that there is lit-
tle by way of marginal cost associated with generating coupons, adding vendors 
and servicing the network of subscribers. As such the transition from a “bricks 
and mortar” business to “cyberspace business” is a relatively straightforward 
one. Online auction models have also burgeoned, disrupting a number of con-
ventional auction houses and models for selling, like the popular paper based 
“Trading Post” model. Online auction models fall into two categories, the con-
ventional English auction model typified by the popular online seller site eBay, 
and the all-pay auction model employed by auctioneers such as “Bidk-
ing.com.au”.  
The former model has become hugely popular online, with websites like eBay 
ranking amongst the most visited websites in the world. Given the obvious simi-
larities between the online model and its bricks and mortar equivalent, it was 
perhaps anticipated that the transition would be somewhat straightforward. Yet, 
there remain some questions about the manner in which such models are regu-
lated, particularly those beyond the well established players such as eBay. How-
ever, in the view of the author it is the emergence of the all-pay auction online 
(the most popular variant being the so called “penny auction”) that is the great-
est cause for concern for regulators. 
Both the similarities and differences between conventional online auctions 
and penny auctions have been a cause of consternation for regulators.  It is 
likely that most internet users would have a reasonable understanding of online 
auction models given the ubiquity of websites such as eBay, where items are 
placed for sale over a defined period and the party offering the highest bid dur-
ing the bidding period has their bid consummated. This model as noted is 
strongly aligned to the English or traditional auction model that most consumers 
would have a strong familiarity with; where an auctioneer offers a good or ser-
vice for sale on behalf of a vendor, and rivals offer bids on the item until a single 
buyer is left with the highest bid value. But consumers are less likely to be famil-
iar with all-pay auction models where bidders acquire bid units that are ex-
pended as they bid for a particular good or service. A particularly popular va-
riant of the all-pay auction is the online “penny auction”. A penny auction is a 




bid units, usually for a dollar, and expend each unit as they bid on a good or ser-
vice, or even bids and monetary sums. Each successive bid also extends the time 
assigned to the auction process, and the auction ends when all parties to the bid-
ding process expend their bid units or where, the bidders to the process lose 
their desire to maintain participation in the bid process.  
Such models are growing in popularity given the seemingly low prices asso-
ciated with goods and services advertised on promoter websites and the ease 
with which an auction model can be conceived, crafted, and administered on-
line. The auction websites frequently assert that their prices are substantially 
lower than rival auction models, such as traditional (English) auction models 
(such as eBay); and in comparison to bricks and mortar sellers (such as Kmart or 
Target) and online sellers (such as Amazon). Penny auction websites unlike oth-
er traditional auction models benefit from the “sunk cost fallacy”. However there 
appears to be a dearth of evidence noting any disclosure of the total spent on 
each item inclusive of the total bid tally, on online penny auction sites.  
The model has met the ire of consumers with many asserting that the auction 
model is misunderstood, and many have vented their anger online. Consumer 
frustration has been reported broadly in both mainstream media, and with pop-
ular broadsheet publications. Many have assumed that securing items through 
this bidding model is analogous with more traditional models. Given the growth 
within this market segment, it is pertinent to analyse how the penny auction 
marketplaces function, and to consider whether enhanced disclosure is neces-
sary.  
Most pertinently, notwithstanding the nature of such selling models, there 
appears to be little by way of regulation moderating the activities of such sellers 
and selling models. This is perplexing given both the similarities and differences 
between these online selling models and their bricks and mortar equivalents.  
While one would anticipate that online auctions, particularly “all-pay auction” 
models would necessitate greater regulation, it appears evident that trade prac-
tices enforcement agencies, and regulatory frameworks have found it challenging 
to keep pace with the rapid changes in consumer activities, preference and the 
emergence of several new selling models such as the increasingly popular penny 
auction online model. Supporting this assertion are West Australian government 
reviews of the regulation of auctioneers that call into question the adequacy of 
current regulatory frameworks. Minister McHale, the then Minister for con-
sumer protection; in conducting the review noted the critical importance of auc-
tion processes to trade and commerce: “auctions and auctioneers now play a 
significant role in balancing supply and demand within the economy to ascertain 
market price. Efficient regulation of the auction industry therefore impacts on 
the performance of the entire economy.”  
The review was concerned largely with the Auction Sales Act (1973) (WA) in 
its application in relation to conventional auctions. This notwithstanding the re-
view did consider the issue of internet auctions at some length. As would be an-




was clearly not contemplated at the time the Act was introduced and no amend- 
ments have been made to the Act in response to the advent of Internet auctions.” 
This is arguably true of all Australian auction related legislation within other 
states, much of which was enacted prior to the advent of the internet. The lack of 
regulatory response to the observed technological revolution is perplexing; it is 
perhaps the pace of technological change that is making the framing of a worka-
ble regulatory response problematic.  
The current paper considers the regulation of online auctioneers and conven-
tional “bricks and mortar” auctioneers from a law and economics perspective. 
This paper analyses the practices adopted by proprietors of penny auction web-
sites, focusing on the policies adopted by the most popular online sellers. Specif-
ically, the article considers divergence in regulatory standards associated with 
online auction proprietors and conventional auctioneers operating out of bricks 
and mortar auctioneering businesses. While the article is written in the context 
of Australian jurisprudence, the findings are broadly relevant to other jurisdic-
tions. In addition, the article shall posit an alternate model of disclosure, which 
would ensure greater consumer protection.  
It is pertinent to note that there is a dearth of research considering the appro-
priateness of current models of disclosure and regulation within the penny auc-
tion industry. Much of the extant literature considers the underlying structure of 
the auction model, comparing this alternative model with more familiar models. 
While some empirical work exists, most of the extant literature employing em-
pirical methods seeks to analyse and quantify the model structure and operation, 
and shows little regard to regulation and disclosure issues.  
2. Literature Review 
Recent research conducted by Kate Tokeley considered a number of proximate 
issues regarding relevant jurisprudence from New Zealand [1]. The research was 
conducted in response to a number of statement made by the New Zealand Mi-
nister of Consumer Affairs. Tokeley asserts that the statements made by gov-
ernment indicate that priority has been assigned to ensuring that regulatory 
pronouncements and technologically neutral. The work of Tokeley is amongst 
the first to consider the adequacy of current pronouncements in response to 
technological innovation is the market for online auctions. Tokeley’s work is 
compelling because it highlights the obvious deficiencies of the regulatory appa-
ratus currently operative within New Zealand and offers a series of recommen-
dations that may be somewhat beneficial in responding to the challenges pre-
sented by online auctions. Similarly while not concerned with the Australian ju-
risdiction, the work does offer some insights that are potentially generalizable.  
Tokeley notes that the two main risks facing consumers using online auction 
sites are that the goods are not delivered or that they are defective in some way. 
The article concludes that there is an urgent need to update the Consumer 
Guarantees Act (1993)1 to expressly cover online auctions. However, this 
 
 




amendment alone will not be sufficient to protect consumers using online auc-
tions.  
The article articulates well the challenges associated with the regulation of on-
line auctions, though it does not consider the matter of unit bid auctions specif-
ically.2 It is contended herein that this auction market warrants specific consid-
eration and is worthy of fuller consideration that has been afforded by the extant 
literature. 
Robert Marshall and Michael Meurer consider the matter of auction regula-
tion, and specifically bidder collusion [2]. Their research asserts that standard 
analysis of cartel behaviour in posted-price markets is often inadequate when 
applied to collusion by bidders at an auction or procurement [2]. The authors 
note that different auction schemes have different levels of susceptibility to col-
lusion, which in turn has implications for resource allocations to ensure en-
forcement. 
The authors assert that auction markets are typically constituted by relatively 
heterogeneous products, and the bidding party must employ significant re-
sources to understand the nature of the offered item so as to establish the ap-
propriate quantum of funds to bid. This process of price discovery is more com-
plex than the process associated with price discovery in non-auction markets 
where homogenous goods are made available for sale. Emily Favre considered 
the approaches adopted by private enterprises in protecting their exposure to 
online auctions, focusing specifically on luxury brands [3]. Mary Calkins, Alexei 
Nikitkov and Vernon Richardson consider the regulation of fraudulent activities 
within online selling environments, though like the Favre study fail to consider 
unit bid auctions, in favour of eBay selling platforms [4]. Daril Gawith offers a 
survey of the issues pertaining to the regulation of online transactions in e-com- 
merce [5]. While not specifically an account pertaining to online auctions, the 
study does consider a number of proximate matters, most notably the significant 
costs associated with dispute resolution and litigation relating to online com-
merce. Brandon Peene considers the regulation of online selling platforms and 
auctions, focusing specifically on the recent Tiffany and LVMH decisions [6].  
Peene highlights the need for improved regulation of online auctioneers, and 
greater clarity in relation to the obligations of online auctioneers in light of 
Tiffanys. The author concludes that the liability of eBay and similar platforms in 
relation to brand owners for the sale of counterfeit items remains unresolved on 
a world-wide basis. This matter along with the regulation of non-similar online 
auctions such as unit bid auctions remains largely absent from the extant litera-
ture, suggesting a genuine dearth of research into online auctions and in par-
ticular unit bid online auctions such as penny auctions.   
3. Introduction to Auction Theory and Auction Regulation 
3.1. Auction Theory, Law and Economics 







serted that auctions are not a new form of price mechanism. The ancient Greeks 
employed auction models to assign mining concessions, though most are more 
familiar with their use of the mechanism for the selling of slaves [7]. In Ancient 
Babylon, the earliest recorded histories suggest that the Babylonians used auc-
tion models to facilitate the sale of wives. The Romans popularised the auction 
model, adopting auction sales for all manner of goods and commodities [8]. 
In modern times auction models have been employed largely by both gov-
ernment and the private sector. Consider for example, the assignment of trea-
sury bonds and bills, where bills are assigned based on the prospective acquirer’s 
bid yield. What of government tender processes, where the government puts to 
tender a service contract or procurement contract, such a process is also an auc-
tion, though it is not consistent with our traditional conception of an auction, 
given these arrangements involve the auctioneer/vendor is seeking the lowest 
price rather than highest price is sought. Indeed some might even suggest that 
government lobbying is a type of auction process, albeit an all pay auction where 
all parties pay but only one party is successful. 
Examples from the private sector are too numerous to account for fully within 
this paper. Consider a few brief examples. Automotive vehicle sales are fre-
quently conducted though auction sale processes. Artwork has been sold 
through auction processes for hundreds of years. Where two or more rival firms 
are seeking to acquire the same target the process is akin to a traditional auction. 
However, it is the internet and the ease with which an auction mechanism can 
be created online that has really driven growth in this model for selling. Firms 
like eBay have become household names as non-traditional auction houses. In-
deed the popularity of eBay has resulted in demand for comparable business 
models. This has resulted in an industry satisfying the demand for such tech-
nology. Scripts3 to create auction houses online are available cheaply, affording 
any interested party the opportunity to launch an auction e-commerce website.  
Broadly speaking, there are said to be several key auction models from which 
all other models derive. The most well-known auction models are the first price 
sealed bid auction and the ascending bid auction. Under the ascending bid mod-
el (sometimes referred to as the English auction), arguably the model most con-
sumers are familiar with, the bidders seek to each bid a higher price than rivals 
until a single bid is left, with all other bidders not prepared to exceed the bid lev-
el. Under a first price sealed bid auction model, each bidder is afforded the op-
portunity to submit a single bid, essentially their “final offer”; this is done pri-
vately without other parties being aware of the bid quantum. The bidder submit-
ting the highest offer is successful. This model is consistent with the commonly 
employed “private sale” model employed in the real estate industry. Other auc-
tion models include, reverse auctions, Dutch auctions, Vickery auctions and all- 
pay auctions.  
3.1.1. Reverse Auctions  
A reverse auction is diametrically opposed to a conventional auction, insofar as 
 
 




the roles of the parties to the auction are reversed [9]. Under a reverse auction 
model, a single buyer seeks to secure the goods or services, and allows compet-
ing bidders (sellers) to offer their best available price. The bidding parties must 
ensure that they meet the requirements of the original contract notice, while of-
fering the buyer a favourable price. The selling parties under a reverse auction 
model seek to win the interest of buyers by reducing their prices in an effort to 
win over the buyer. For a fuller analysis of this delineation, consider Volk [9]. 
3.1.2. Dutch Auctions 
A Dutch auction (sometimes referred to as an “open outcry descending auc-
tion”) is akin to a sealed first price auction, insofar as each party has the oppor-
tunity to offer their best bid price once, all things being equal. The Dutch auc-
tion model commences with the auctioneer offering a good or service for sale 
commencing with the highest auction price, and gradually lowering the price 
until a price is reached at which a bid is made, with the successful bidder only 
having to make a single bid, and the auction only being constituted by a single 
bid [10].  
3.1.3. Vickery Auctions  
A Vickery auction is best understood as a “sealed bid, second price auction”, be-
cause each bidder submits a price without any knowledge of the bid values 
lodged by other prospective bidders, and because the price paid is not the high-
est bidders winning price but the price bid by the second highest bidder.  
3.1.4. All-Pay Auctions 
All-pay auctions are typified by a number of different structures rather than a 
single unifying structure. They are all however auctioning models, involving all 
bidding entities paying a sum or sums of money during the auction process. 
Well known all-pay auction models include the Tullock auction and the Dollar 
auction. 
3.1.5. Raffles versus Auctions 
A raffle may be understood as conceptually similar to a penny auction however 
there are some critical differences between each model. A raffle involved the as-
signment of a ticket or tickets to participants based on the quantum of money 
expended by the participant, on the initial purchase of tickets. Each ticket con-
fers an opportunity to win a prize or prizes. All tickets are aggregated, with a 
winner selected. The point at which a ticket is purchased or expended in no way 
moderates the outcome of the process.  
Esther et al. (2007) consider another intriguing and unique and related auc-
tion model, the discrete bid English auction, with the authors noting that there is 
a dearth of research considering non-traditional frameworks. The results offer 
limited generalizability and assignment to the area of penny auctions given their 
non-continuous nature. There remains a dearth of research in relation to penny 
auctions. [11] 




a coherent framework of analysis. Focusing specifically on revenue the authors 
contend that expected revenue is greatest under war of attrition conditions. The 
authors also identify adequate conditions for monotonic symmetric bidding 
strategies [12].  
Augenblick also responds to the dearth of research relating to penny auctions. 
Augenblick evidences that the bidding behavior may be explained by the naïve 
sunk cost fallacy. He contends that while bidders make higher profits through 
time the learning process is identified as slow [13].   
3.1.6. Online Auction Models: Are Online Platform Sellers Auctioneers?  
Broadly speaking, contemporary online auctions fall into the two noted catego-
ries: English “style” (traditional) auction models and all-pay action models.4 In 
this study we consider two auction models/auctioneer groups, the eBay model 
and the “Penny auction” model. The issue of whether an eBay (or bidking.com. 
au) sale constitutes an auction based sale is a complex one, and is aided by a ful-
ler understanding of each auction framework. Herein, each auction model is 
considered in greater detail with credence given to the similarities and differ-
ences between online and real world auctions. Subsequent emphasis is placed on 
whether eBay model and penny auction models constitute auctions.  
3.1.7. The eBay Model 
The eBay model, prima facie, appears to resemble real world auctions closely 
however there are some notable differences. The eBay model is essentially a 
platform business model with eBay serving as the platform provider. The eBay 
model is sustained by groups of interested buyers and sellers that promote goods 
for sale through the eBay website. As such, the eBay model is not a “true” auc-
tion model in the conventional sense of the word. While the platform business is 
generally referred to as an auction model, there are some noteworthy differences 
between a true auction and the eBay model of online selling. 
EBay essentially provides a mechanism for sale of goods and services and an 
integrated online payment gateway through its online payments facility PayPal. 
Registered sellers determine the price, description, saleable quantity and dura-
tion of eBay “auctions”. They upload photographs, descriptors, and other rele-
vant information to induce sale. EBay provides a messaging system between sel-
lers, that allows buyers and sellers to communicate in relation to the listed 
goods/services but to maintain anonymity nonetheless. Registered buyers, can 
post questions and make bids on a listed item. The list format can vary, with 
commonly understood formats like private sale, and ascending bid models 
 
 
4Within the noted categories, there are a number of variants. Consider first the English (traditional) 
model. For clarity’s sake, eBay is employed as the central example and theme when analysing these 
issues in relation to English (traditional) auctions. This example is employed given the general un-
derstanding most possess in relation to the eBay model(s), and the need for brevity within these pre-
liminary sections. In relation to “All-pay auction models” this study shall focus on the “penny auc-
tion model”. Several popular and noteworthy websites serve as examples. Given that the analysis is 
concerned primarily with penny auctions and given the substantiative research conducted in relation 
to traditional auction models and the popular eBay model, herewith the ensuing analysis shall focus 




available.   
The Sellers and Buyers develop a persona within the eBay community, based 
on item quality, timeliness of the post-sale process (confirmation and delivery) 
and support; they generate an online approval rating. Other buyers and sellers 
use such approval ratings to determine whether they want to engage in com-
merce with fellow community members. EBay serves as a market maker, that in 
truth shares equal if not greater similarity with the conventional paper based 
“Trading post newspapers” of bygone eras. EBay does not take possession of 
goods nor does it moderate quality per se; it merely charges listing fees to the 
registered sellers. 
Pertinently, unlike traditional “real world” auctions, eBay auctions are not 
moderated by spatial distance, the location of the buyer and seller is of little re-
levance to the buyers and sellers, beyond the costs and mechanics of transporta-
tion. This means that the transactions are not moderated by the geographic loca-
tion of the parties to the transaction, which it may be argued is at stark contrast 
with a traditional auction. Traditional auctions are generally understood to oc-
cur at a specific geographic location, and while telephony has made off site bid-
ding a possibility since the popularisation of the telephone, it does not enable the 
same level of off-site participation as eBay style “auctioneering”.  
This relates to a further critical difference between online auctions and real 
world auctions, the mechanism for bidding. Most traditional auctions occur 
through open outcry, with the auctioneer accepting audible bids (or gesture 
based bids) from individuals attending the auction. EBay auctions are essentially 
anonymous auctions that result in greater information asymmetries arguably 
than conventional auctions and buyers are not able to benefit from knowledge of 
other parties offers. This is pertinent too because eBay enables so called “auto-
mated” or “proxy” sales, where the platform initiates a bid on the prospective 
buyer’s behalf based on a buyer proscribed upper limit, when the prospective 
buyer’s bid is exceeded by a rival bid. 
Equally relevant is the critical role that auctioneers play in establishing the sa-
leable rights to a given item, is merchantability, its quality, and its authenticity. 
Real world auctioneers play a critical vetting role that online sellers do not; per 
se. EBay does not warrant that the goods sold are authentic, or that they are at a 
merchantable or saleable quality. Equally eBay does not establish the quantity of 
goods to be sold. In the real world auctioneers have the capacity to provide all of 
the services noted. EBay lacks the capacity to offer these services and cannot at-
test to the underlying nature of the transaction, or indeed whether the transac-
tion will be consummated. 
Given these differences it is evident that eBay operates merely as a medium for 
the exchange of goods. It is in essence more of a digital equivalent to the analo-
gue world “classifieds pages” found in print newspapers, rather than a digital 
equivalent to the analogue world English auction. While the term auction is as-
cribed to eBay selling in everyday speech, the term eBay auction is part of com-




This view is supported by Kanchana Kariyawasam and Guy Scott, and they state 
[14]: 
In effect, eBay operates only as an online platform service provider or elec-
tronic medium through which bids can be made. EBay does not, in fact, 
conduct actual auctions and “persons or businesses that assist sellers in 
placing items for sale on eBay are not conducting an auction or acting as 
auctioneers”. In its actual operation, furthermore, eBay performs functions 
quite distinct from, and non-equivalent to, those of traditional auctioneers. 
In reality, eBay neither operates in the same way as traditional auctioneers, 
nor does it have the same responsibilities as a traditional auctioneer. This 
raises the significant question, then, as to whether consumers participating 
in what are superficially or ostensibly “online auctions” are adequately pro-
tected when the actual process itself does not, in fact, constitute an auction 
per se. 
As such, eBay quite rightfully should not be captured by extant legislation 
pertaining to auctioneers, given the key structural differences between each 
model. While this delineation of the eBay model may be inconsistent with the 
popular perception of the model and its structure, with many arguably ascribing 
to the view that the model is an auction model, to consider eBay and analogous 
models for online selling auctions in the tradition is errant. Whether provisions 
pertaining to the process of online selling and advertising, and trade practices 
legislation afford adequate protections to consumers, are entirely separate issues.   
3.1.8. The Penny Auction Model 
The penny auction model in no way resembles the analogue equivalents. The 
penny auction is not like a traditional ascending bid auction but pertinently 
penny auctions are in no way similar to eBay selling models. A penny auction in 
economic parlance is a type of all-pay auction5, specifically a bid fee variant of an 
all pay auction model. All-pay auction models have been used to describe a 
number of scenarios, from R & D races, to political lobbing processes.6 They are 
not models that have been ubiquitous like ascending bid auctions within the 
public sphere. Indeed prior to the advent of the online penny auction it is unlikely 
that most people would have encountered the model within an analogue market.  
While the entomology of the concept and terminology is uncertain, it would 
appear that the term is consistent with the generalized delineations offered in the 
unit bid auction literature [15] [16]. However the modern online penny auction 
 
 
5A war of attrition game is akin to an all-pay auction model. In a war of attrition game each partici-
pant continues to participate at their own expense and the expense of other participants. War of at-
trition games are moderated solely by the resource endowments of each participant. War of attrition 
games cannot be accommodated using payoff matrices given the potential bids made by participants 
and as such are more problematic to analyse than many other game theoretic frameworks. Indeed 
war of attrition games bear striking resemblance to contemporary penny auction models. As such 
the war of attrition literature is highly relevant to the current study.  
6Arguably the best known model of an all-pay auction is the Tullock model. Within a Tullock model 
auction, all bidding parties submit bids, but in this auction structure the successful and unsuccessful 




is more complex that the model framework posited within much of the extant 
literature, because it is a multi-participant game with asymmetric information. A 
penny auction, in economic terms is best understood as a multiplayer game in 
which all bidders pay for bid units expended in the auction process. 
Unlike a traditional auction, the party with the greatest willingness to pay 
does not necessarily win the auction, because the sequence, and critically the 
time at which each bid unit is employed determines the likelihood of success; 
and not merely the willingness to pay.  
Let us consider an example. Four geographically dispersed individuals Adam, 
Bill, Carson, and David are keen to purchase a HDTV. The individuals are un-
connected and are keen to purchase a High Definition Television, at the best 
price. They register with XYZ Penny Auctions Pty Ltd, a well-known online auc-
tion website. The Auction house sells bid units for $1 per unit. Each bid unit en-
titles the buyer to a bid on any item within the auction houses portfolio. Each 
auction is time specific, with the total allotted time starting at 30 minutes. With 
each additional bid the time rises by a further 20 seconds, to a maximum 30 mi-
nutes and 20 seconds. Adam, Bill, Carson and David purchase 110, 100, 90 and 
80 bids respectively. The acquired bid units indicate that, all things being equal, 
Adam has the greatest willingness to pay [17].  
As asserted, this does not in any way guarantee success, rather the probability 
of success is a function of the bid sequence and the number of bidders. Under a 
conventional English auction model, each party could bid prices they deem ap-
propriate with the party offering up the highest bid the victor. Under such con-
ditions, all things being equal, Adam would secure the television. 
As with the eBay model, there are a number of critical distinctions between 
penny auctions and conventional auctions. Penny auctions like eBay selling are 
not moderated by geography per se, with participation from a number of geo-
graphically dispersed individuals possible.  
Unlike traditional auctions, all bidding occurs anonymously through elec-
tronic means rather than open outcry. The essentially anonymous nature of 
penny auctions arguably results in greater information asymmetries than con-
ventional auctions. While buyers are able to benefit from knowledge of other 
buyers bids, through real time observance, it is impractical to track the level of 
cost “sunk” (how many bid units have been expended) in the bidding process by 
any given bidder through the observance of rivals (For further discussion of 
proximate issues, see [18] [19]). These inconsistencies with conventional auction 
structures make the penny auction model so worrisome.  
However, consistent with conventional auctions occurring in the real world 
and in direct contrast with eBay selling, penny auction providers do appear to 
operate as “auctioneers” or in a manner similar in both function and form to 
auctioneers rather than as platform providers. Rather than providing a platform 
for buyers and sellers, the penny “auctioneers” offer new goods for sale having 
determined merchantability/saleability, quality, quantity and authenticity of the 




There appears to be little regulation moderating the activities of purveyors of 
such online auction models. The law appears remarkably inconsistent in its 
treatment of auctioneers operating through open outcry models and those of-
fering similar services through computer moderated means.  
3.1.9. Penny Auctions an Economic Model 
Let us consider penny auctions in economic terms P(x) equals the probability of 
an individual bidding x, therefore the cumulative of each bidder bidding x 
number of bids must be quantified. Consider the probability of a sequence of 
three bids denoted below.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3P x P x P x P x× × =     
As noted the probability that a participant will bid x is P(x), therefore the cu-
mulative probability is n − 1. 
( )( )1nP x −  
Let us assume that all bids made by each bidder equate to x, so x equals the 
total number or sum of bids, and u is the total number of bid units. If we assume 
that all bidders have the same number of bids and bid sequentially then it does 
not matter if u is 1 or 100 or 1000. If u is 1 the x = u.  
( ) ( )( )1nP x u −= ∑  
( ) ( )( )1nP x x −=  
Applying the indifference principle 




 − =  
Employing the derivative ( ) ( )p x P x′=  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 11
1
n np x P x x
n
− − ′= =  − 
∑  
Solving for the (x) for p(x)  
( ) ( ) 1x xp x dx
n
= =  
Therefore the value of x gets smaller as the n number of participants increases.  
While n is indeterminate the rational bidder can observe both the frequency 
of bids and the parties bidding within the auction. They can also observe the 
number of bids made during prior auctions through the perusal of recently 
completed auction outcomes.  
Therefore the sum of bids per bidder (x) should become smaller as the value 
of n becomes larger. So as the number of participants increases the rational bid-
der should reduce the quantum and or frequency of their bids.  
However given the challenges associated with tracking bidding frequencies 
and the bid unit totals of rival bidders, bidders may not bid rationally. Moreover, 
bidders are incapable of bidding at their level of marginal benefit as they would 




with a lower marginal willingness to pay may succeed the expense of individuals 
with a marginal willingness to pay. These parameters may give rise to irrational 
bid frequencies. This notwithstanding, it is important to acknowledge a poten-
tially more deleterious phenomena associated with unit bid auction models. In-
dividuals with large marginal willingness to pay functions may by virtue of the 
unitary bidding mode expend significant resources in the process of bidding 
without achieving any bid success. As such, the bids expended represent a sunk 
cost, however the bidding entity may not perceive them as such. This is known 
as the naive sunk cost fallacy. It may lead bidders to bid beyond what they may 
rationally deem to be an appropriate number of total bids. This issue is magni-
fied by many penny auction models that return all bids made by the winning 
bidder to the winning bidder and only require them to pay the total value of bit 
units made7.  
Under traditional Dutch and English auction conditions, bidding parties de-
termine the value of their bid based on their marginal willingness to pay, they 
have no regard for any sunk costs because no resources are expended with each 
successive bid. The bidders are not affected by the naive sunk cost fallacy. Under 
unit bid cost auction conditions each successive bid increases the quantum of 
sunk cost accruing two bidding parties, this may cause them to allow their 
quantum of expended bids to impact subsequent bidding behavior. This makes 
the penny auction bidding structure tantamount to poker machine style gam-
bling where frequently parties have regard to their losses when engaged in sub-
sequent bidding behavior.  
3.2. Regulation of Penny Auctions, Traditional Auctioneers  
versus Online Auctioneers 
3.2.1. The Regulation of Auctioneers within the U.S. 
Within the United States of America, there is no federal law pertaining to the 
regulation of the auction process and auctioneers. The regulation of auctions is 
therefore left to the states. While not all U.S. states have regulations in place 
pertaining to auctioneer licensing, most states do regulate auction activity. The 
basis for much of this legislation is the Uniform Commercial code, adopted by 
all states except Louisiana. It is pertinent to acknowledge however that the UCC 
is merely a code of commerce, or guidance document, with little precedent val-
ue. It however was the basis for drafted legislation within 49 states.  
As a result of the adoption of the UCC, the majority of U.S. state legislatures 
regulate the activities of auctioneers operating out of “bricks and mortar” auction 
houses.8 The following section briefly outlines some of the standards adopted by 
 
 
7Consider for example, a scenario involving ten bidders within a penny auction model bidding on a 
DVD. Each bidding party bids one hundred units equating to one dollar and as such the final price 
for the contested auction good, the DVD, is ten dollars. The successful bidder will receive their 100 
bid units back and be required to pay the ten dollar DVD price. As such their net cost is nine dollars, 
while each other bidder has gained no benefit through the auction but has expended one hundred 
bid units each.  
8Given the time of drafting of the UCC, predating the advent of the internet, the UCC did not con-





state legislatures and is not intended to be exhaustive. Significant detail of each 
pronouncement from with each legislature would result in an inordinately long 
article. The level of regulation varies across jurisdictions however most of the 
legislatures adopting stringent standards, regulate the age, nature of training, as-
sessment, license fees, continuing professional development, of auctioneers and 
conduct of sale and advertising practices adopted by auctioneers [20]. While not 
all states regulate auction and auctioneer activities, broadly speaking those that 
have employed a model of regulation require that: 
1) An applicant be 18 years or older and possess a high school diploma or the 
equivalent; 
2) Applicants attend a course of study at a state licensing board certified auctio-
neer program or serve an apprenticeship of six months to two years;  
3) Applicants pass an examination of applicable state auctioneer licensing laws;  
4) Applicants pay the applicable licensing fees;  
5) Applicants complete continuing education courses;  
6) Applicants follow state standards for the conduct of a sale; and  
7) Applicants adhere to the state standards for advertising auctions.  
State legislatures also allow for auctioneers to operate beyond the borders of 
their state of registration, where relevant licensing reciprocal agreements exist. 
This allows licensed auctioneers to ply their trade where they have met the stan-
dards of accreditation in other states, beyond the state of registration.  
The practices adopted by the state legislatures ensure that the licensed auctio-
neers are well prepared for their duties, and constitute a profession. Critically the 
licensing framework actively encourages ethical practices and consistent levels of 
competence, matters of critical importance to any profession. As with most pro-
fessions, the legislature require on-going education to ensure competence is 
maintained. Most critically the legislatures require that the auctioneer follows 
state standards in relation to the conduct of the sales. These practices instill faith 
within bidders. Consumer can act in good faith knowing that the vendor and 
auctioneer are required to act in good faith, and conduct themselves in a profes-
sional manner. Where consumers believe that the auctioneer has not met his 
duty of care they can lodge a complaint with the relevant registration body. 
Where the actions of a registered auctioneer are in violation of the state legisla-
tion, there is the potential for the withdrawal of licensing provision and as such 
the right to operate as an auctioneer. Each state has a grievance process in rela-
tion to consumer complaints with many states, providing a mechanism for re-
compense to the affected party in the event where the actions of the auctioneer, 
through negligence or design necessitate the provision of such recompense.   
While “bricks and mortar” auctioneers (and consequently bricks and mortar 
auction houses) are closely regulated, the laws for online auction houses are far 
less developed.  
3.2.2. The Regulatory Framework within Australia 




registration was somewhat consistent, however unlike the U.S. there appears to 
be no legislation requiring the operators of online auction houses to meet the 
same exacting standards as traditional “bricks & mortar” businesses. Moreover, 
the Australian industry is now largely less regulated that the U.S. industry, 
though consumer harm is moderated through consumer protections legislation.  
Licensing regimes have differed somewhat within Australia historically, with 
some states requiring that auctioneers be licensed, while others not enacting any 
specific legislation necessitating the licensing of auctioneers. While at present, 
only Queensland and Western Australia require that auctioneers be licensed, a 
number of jurisdictions previously required that auctioneers be regulated. Vic-
toria, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Ter-
ritory have all previously enacted legislation requiring the licensing of auctio-
neers, with licensing requirements in these jurisdictions displaying strong simi-
larity. The licensing regimes evident in Queensland and Tasmania were consi-
dered the most onerous, and differed somewhat from other jurisdictions, adopt-
ing a more onerous set of requirements for licensing. South Australia and New 
South Wales, differed from other jurisdictions historically, insofar as they did 
not require any specific licensing beyond licensing that may be required to oper-
ate in compliance with other acts, such and the Pawnbrokers Act, and the Stock 
Agents Act. 
The obvious differences evident within licensing regimes caused the recogni-
tion of auctioneering professionals across jurisdictions to be problematic. This 
was been noted by a number of competition reviews that sought to promote 
greater mutual recognition of licensing arrangements. Indeed governments have 
recursively sought to come together to enable better mutual recognition of quali-
fications and licensing across jurisdictions, and auctioneers have been consi-
dered during such discussions. The governments initiated the Vocational Educa-
tion, Employment and Training Committee (VEETAC). The committee con-
cluded that the licensing requirements for a number of professions be removed, 
with auctioneers amongst the professions where such a recommendation was 
made.  
During the 1990s, a number of jurisdictions removed their requirements for 
licensing, with licensing now only required within Queensland and Western 
Australia. These decisions were made notwithstanding the potentially delete-
rious impacts of such deregulation on consumer interests. Interestingly there are 
no specific provisions in place to moderate the actions of online auctioneers, 
with recent reviews of auction regulation noting that at the time of drafting on-
line auctions were not anticipated. Australian jurisdictions have seen little value 
in licensing auctioneers operating out of traditional bricks and mortar opera-
tions, and logically this has translated to a similarly lassie faire approach being 
adopted to online auction houses.  
Interestingly it would appear that there is little credence afforded to the 
burgeoning “penny auction” model notwithstanding the significant consumer 




in place within any Australian jurisdiction concerning the activities of online 
auctioneers. Recently, Consumer Affairs, Victoria appeared to grow so con-
cerned about the issues created by this new business model that it issued the fol-
lowing alert notice: 
“Penny” or “bidding fee” auctions are a relatively new form of online buy-
ing. Participants enter an online auction to purchase heavily discounted 
goods and services, paying a non-refundable fee for every bid.  
The price rises with each bid as participants try to purchase the discounted 
item. The last participant to bid when the time limit expires gets the item. 
However, the final bid is not the total cost; the total cost is the final bid 
price plus the cost of bidding. 
Consumers should also be wary of disreputable sites, which may use com-
puter generated bidding (called “bots”) to drive the cost higher. Another 
practice called “shilling” involves site operators using a third party to place 
dummy bids to drive the cost higher.  
If you plan to take part in a penny auction, research the site you intend to 
use, ensure you read all of the terms and conditions carefully and keep the 
true cost in mind.9 
The statement suggests a degree of confusion on the part of consumers, and 
perhaps a disregard or misunderstanding amongst consumers about the bid unit 
costs when determining the price of goods. While the auction industry is now 
less regulated, with few licensing regimes in operation other than those within 
Queensland and Western Australia, and those necessitated by other meeting 
compliance requirements of other related acts, such as the Stock Agents Act, 
legislative protections exist through the consumer protection legislation. The 
adequacy of current pronouncements will be considered currently. 
3.2.3. The Adequacy of the Regulation of Online Auctioneers  
It is apparent that the legislative pronouncements that govern the activities of 
auctioneers have not kept pace with technological change. The pseudo online 
auction models that predominate on the internet are better understood as plat-
form based models, or sale facilitation models and as such are not true auctions. 
The eBay model has already been acknowledged as such herein. It is essentially 
an example of a platform seller business, akin to a classified section within a 
newspaper. Yet, there are a number of traditional auctions now moderated using 
the internet, and auction houses using their online presence to offer more con-
ventional auctioneer services. These auctioneers are not merely providing a 
platform for vendors to make good available to potential purchasers but rather 
are operating as auctioneers online. The increasingly popular penny auction 
models are also commonly observed online, and yet remain largely unregulated. 
Given the significant complaints parlayed at such models and the significant po-
tential for consumer harm, this lassie faire approach appears unwise, or at the 







The nature of the internet makes it possible for individuals and organizations 
around the world to provide traditional auction services online while not meet-
ing the requirements of Australian jurisdictions, in relation to licensing and 
compliance. This is arguably the most critical challenge to reform, the ease of 
avoidance, particularly in relation to regulation of online auctions. The critical 
challenge for regulators is to how jurisdictional issues can be moderated.  
The question arises as to whether there is need for greater regulatory oversight 
of penny auctions given their unique nature, and the significant potential for loss 
and consumer harm, and whether computer mediated selling methods enable 
greater regulatory avoidance. These questions give rise to two relevant consider-
ations. Firstly, whether broader consumer protections contained in the Compe-
tition and Consumer Act (2011), provide adequate protections to consumers 
given the somewhat unique and confusing nature of penny auction models. Se-
condly, whether computer mediated auction selling models enable greater regu-
latory avoidance; and given the potential for regulatory avoidance whether such 
selling methods necessitate greater regulatory oversight. 
The obvious challenges associated with regulating online vendors operating 
online auction houses and more contemporary penny auction models is that any 
regulatory pronouncement would place the local industry at a distinct disadvan-
tage to foreign rival firms. Local entities that meet the expectations of any local 
licensing regime would face firm competition from non-compliant entities op-
erating from abroad, where in many cases there is a dearth of legislation mod-
erating their activities.   
By virtue of the anonymity afforded by the internet to participants engaging 
many internet based activities it is arguable that they could be employed more 
easily to engage in unlawful activities. The claims made in relation to internet 
auctions and auction-like processes are too numerous to recount fully but in-
clude non-delivery of goods by vendors, misleading advertising and the quality 
of goods being misrepresented. 
3.3. The Adequacy of Consumer Protections Enacted Through the  
Competition and Consumer Act 
Australian Trade practices legislation sought to afford significant protections to 
consumers; these protections have been extended within the Australian Con-
sumer Law. The ACL extends upon the implied warranties of the TPA, by 
enacting a number of consumer guarantees that cannot be removed through 
contract. Consumers making purchases online are entitled to the same protec-
tions as individuals making purchases through offline purchasing arrangements, 
for example those transacting through mail order, over the counter, or purchas-
ing through door to door selling arrangements. These protections are afforded to 
the extent that the purchaser meets the definition of consumer.  
It is noteworthy that the TPA was silent in relation to the application of 
provisions within the digital economy beyond “telegraphic & telephonic” activi-




the drafters of the legislation could not have envisaged the creation and growth 
of the digital economy and the advent and emergence of the internet, and inter-
net mediated communications tools.  
Rhonda Smith asserted that: 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is, however, generally silent as to 
whether its provisions apply to conduct carried out electronically, although 
the breadth of its controls would arguably apply to all online activities car-
ried out between corporations and consumers. Most of the consumer pro-
tection provisions of the Act specifically apply to conduct which “involved 
the use of postal, telegraphic or telephonic services” (s. 6(3) which would 
seem to exclude the internet and email which are not specifically telephon-
ic) [21]. 
While the terms online and internet are not a feature of the provisions, it is 
likely that they would nonetheless be captured by the provisions, as neither is 
specifically excluded [14].  
In relation to the sale of goods or services, the TPA extended a significant 
number of protections to consumers. Section 53, affords consumers protections 
in relation to misleading representations made about a good or service.  Section 
58 makes unlawful the acceptance of monies absent of an intention to supply, or 
to supply goods that are materially different to those offered and accepted 
through a sale of goods transaction. Section 70 is largely concerned with ensur-
ing that goods provided are consistent with the delineation offered in relation to 
the goods. Section 71(1) makes unlawful the supply of jobs by a corporation 
where such supply is not of a merchantable quality. Section 71(2) asserted that 
goods must it suited to the purposes noted by the consumer to the vendor at the 
time of sale or through the process by which the sale has been facilitated.  
Kariyawasam noted that:  
The implied conditions ss. 70(1), 71(1) and 71(2) do not apply to the sale of 
goods by auction. The author claims that Australian businesses could po-
tentially use eBay to dispose of goods which are not of merchantable quali-
ty, or are not fit for purpose, without being hindered by these implied 
terms. State based Sale of Goods Acts may imply similar terms into these 
transactions, but those terms can generally be excluded through contract, 
whereas the TPA implied terms cannot be excluded, in accordance with 
s.68. These provisions are especially pertinent to online transactions, as the 
consumer is not able to physically inspect the goods before buying them. 
Additionally, the TPA did afford extraterritorial effects, seeking to protect 
Australian consumers from vendors beyond Australian shores [14]. Specifically, 
ss. 5(1), 6(1) and 6(3) sought to afford protection to Australian consumers from 
prohibited conduct of vendors abroad, offering a limited number of remedies.  
Since 2010, a number of worthwhile reforms have been progressively imple-




seek to afford the community a more proactive and nationally consistent. Many 
of the former TPA prohibitions have been moved within the new pronounce-
ments but at their core remain largely the same as the former pronouncements. 
This is certainly true of the provisions pertaining to unconscionable conduct, 
misleading conduct and false/misleading representations.  
Amongst the most substantiative changes enacted are the new consumer 
guarantees, these guarantees replacing the implied warranties evident under the 
TPA. The new guarantees appear to be heavily influenced by the New Zealand 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. The consumer guarantees cannot be excluded. 
The ACL offers a series of remedies for failures to comply with a consumer 
guarantee. These guarantees do not apply where the sale occurs between an in-
dividual and other individuals or businesses. They are also not applicable to tra-
ditional auction environments where an auctioneer operates as an agent on be-
half of a seller. The guarantees would apply to sales where a business employs an 
online website or auction site to sell goods or services, where the auction website 
does not have an agency relationship or seek to represent the seller. Therefore, 
the guarantees would apply to business sellers on eBay as well as the promoters 
of penny auction websites such as bidking.com.au. 
The new prohibitions for false and or misleading conduct are arguably the 
most beneficial to consumers purchasing goods online and in particular those 
purchasing through online auction mechanisms such as conventional English 
auctions online and online penny auctions. The new ACL provisions sought to 
expand upon the related provisions within the TPA. Section 18 of the ACL, re-
placing s.52 of the TPA, specifically prohibits a person from engaging in mis-
leading and/or deceptive conduct. The jurisprudence relevant to s.52 remains 
applicable to s.18. The prohibition is not limited to the supply of goods or ser-
vices.  
While recent changes to ACL appear meritorious, they do little to address the 
issues raised by this article. Most critically, none of the provisions within the 
ACL address directly disclosures relating to the sale of goods using non-conven- 
tional auction models, such as Tullock or unit bid auction models.  
Clear disclosure of a non-conventional (Non English/Dutch model) bid model 
may be necessary, and amendments to consumer provisions relating to the sale 
of good may be highly beneficial. Such disclosure would ensure that many of the 
issues highlighted by consumers would be ameliorated. A clear delineation of the 
bidding structure would ensure that buyers and sellers could operate in good 
faith, and confidence in the penny auction market. 
3.4. Possible Reform to Regulations of Online Penny  
Auctions and All-Pay Auctions 
National Licensing Scheme for Unit Bid Auctions 
A national licensing scheme for unit bid auctions would represent a parsimo-
nious and low cost mechanism through which all-pay auction structures could 




meet basic disclosure and user education requirements thus improving the over-
all structure of the market.  
While it would appear evident that relatively popular platform based selling 
businesses adopting eBay style selling models are not operating as true online 
auction houses, consumer protections exist to protect those engaging with such 
models, particularly where businesses employ such models to engage in the sale 
of goods. Such models are also consistent with what are arguably the most fa-
miliar styles of auction based selling (traditional English auctions), and as such 
are less likely to create confusion by virtue of their bid mechanism.  
This is not true of unit bid/all-pay auctions and as such it would appear that 
in relation to such auctions, the existing consumer protections do little to pro-
tect those participating from limited bidding mechanism related disclosure in-
formation. A national scheme would ensure that consumers would be able to 
participate within penny auction markets with greater confidence.   
As noted, the obvious challenge with any regulatory regime remains. Any li-
censing regime would assign greater compliance costs to local entities and would 
place them at a disadvantage to foreign firms. Such an approach may also en-
courage “jurisdiction shopping”, where prospective operators of penny auctions 
and related all pay auction models establish themselves within polities evidenc-
ing very limited regulations in relation to auctions and online selling models. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that the auction markets and in partic-
ular online auction markets are heavily reliant on trust. A trust engendering de-
vice such as a licensing regime may have the potential to moderate the spending 
behaviours of participants. Where a purchaser observes both a licensed and an 
unlicensed penny auction vendor online, the participation of an entity within a 
licensing regime is likely to influence the behaviour of the prospective purchaser 
significantly.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Auctioneering was once largely an offline activity, synonymous with dusty 
rooms and numbered handheld placards. This selling approach has changed 
dramatically with the advancement of technology, and online auctions are now 
the popular mode of auction sale. The significant deregulation of the auction 
industry has meant that auctioneers operating in both online and offline auctio-
neering environments, are now operating within an industry largely absent of a 
licensing regime, notwithstanding the regulatory apparatuses in effect within 
Queensland and Western Australia. 
Other jurisdictions do not require any specific licensing beyond licensing that 
may be required to operate in compliance with other acts, such as the Pawnbro- 
kers & Second Hand Dealers Act and the Stock Agents Act. While this ensures 
that there are a number of additional protections in place in relation to a num-
ber of offline auction markets, such as the property market, the deregulation and 
pertinently the removal of licensing regime, which has meant that consumers 




auction mechanisms.  
New categories of auction that have not been evident historically in offline 
markets are now becoming popularized online. This is certainly true of penny 
auctions and related unit bid auctions. The absence of licensing regimes has 
meant that many providers of such auction mechanisms have gone largely unli-
censed and unregulated. 
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